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The second question the Court addressed was whether the water court
properly held the claimants presented adequate evidence to show they did not
intend to abandon their water right. The State argued the evidence presented
was insufficient because (i) the claimants did not offer adequate evidence to
show Ray stopped irrigating his property because of his age or health; and (ii)
the connection of three-phase power to the property did not necessarily indicate
intent to install a pivot irrigation system.
The Court held the claimants' presentation of the difficulty of flood irrigation on the property, coupled with Lyle's testimony regarding his father's age
and health, were sufficient to overcome the presumption of abandonment. The
Court stated there was no reason to doubt Lyle's statements about his father and
the property. The Court also found Ray's installation of a pivot irrigation system
was proof enough of his father's belief that Lyle would want to use that type of
system. The Court also stated that Lyle's subsequent irrigation with the new
system supported the notion that the Weists did not intend to abandon the water
right. Weighing the evidence presented in its totality, the Court held the water
court correctly concluded that the water master erred in finding a lack of sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of intent to abandon the water right.
The Court therefore affirmed the water court's decision to apply 79Ranch
retroactively. The Court also affirmed the water court's conclusion that the
claimants presented evidence sufficient to justify the decades-long nonuse and,
therefore, enough to rebut the presumption of abandonment.
Lauren Bushong
Hughes v. Hughes, 305 P.3d 772 (Mont. 2013) (holding (i) the lower court

had jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged stock water easement; (ii) partition of
land does not extinguish existing water rights on other land unless the parties
intended such a result; and (iii) an implied easement was the appropriate rem-

edy to allow continued use of the stock water right).
The Supreme Court of Montana ("Court") reviewed various complaints
Jack and Shirley Hughes ("Jack") filed against their son, Johnny Hughes
("Johnny"). The Tenth Judicial District Court ("lower court") consolidated
Jack's complaints, which concerned money he loaned to Johnny, an alleged
stock water easement following a partition of jointly-owned land, and a disputed
pasture lease. The lower court found in favor of Johnny on all matters except

the water rights issue. Jack appealed the non-water issues and Johnny crossappealed the stock water issue.
These disputes arose in the wake of a falling-out between Jack and Johnny
and the subsequent referee-supervised property partition. In separate deeds
dated 1984, 1985, and 1986, Jack granted Johnny an undivided fifty-six percent
interest in Melby Ranch but retained a life estate in the buildings and improvements. Thus, at the time of partition in 2011, Jack and Johnny owned Melby
Ranch as tenants in common. In light of their falling-out, the parties engaged
three referees to partition the land. Jack and Johnny agreed that Johnny would
receive the section of Melby Ranch that included Flatwillow Creek although

Jack had previously acquired an adjudicated water right to use Flatwillow Creek
for stock water purposes. The parties agreed to fence their boundaries to better
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reflect the partition. However, the parties did not specify how this partition
would affectJack's stock water right, which he used to sustain his cattle business
on land not subject to the partition. In his complaint, Jack sought an easement
either to allow his cattle access to Flatwillow Creek or to construct a pipe to bring
water across Johnny's parcel. Johnny opposed, arguing that the partition agreement did not provide for a stock water easement.
The lower court granted Jack a water gap through the fence and over
Johnny's land, but in the same order determined it lacked jurisdiction over the
water issue. When the parties asked for clarification, the lower court stated it
no longer had jurisdiction to grant the water gap. Johnny thereafter appealed
the original order granting Jack a water gap.
After resolving the non-water issues, the Court discussed the lower court's
jurisdiction and found it well-established that district courts have jurisdiction to
supervise already-adjudicated water rights. Jack possessed rights to use Flatwillow Creek for stock water through J&S Family Limited Partnership. The Court
also stated that, regardless of the lower court's jurisdiction over water rights, an
easement is a legally distinct property right. For these reasons, the Court concluded the lower court possessed the jurisdiction to determine whether Jack
held an implied easement to continue using Flatwillow Creek.
Jack argued he possessed an implied easement by existing use overJohnny's
part of the partitioned land. The Court first recited the three elements for the
creation of an easement by existing use: (i) prior unity of ownership of the two
parcels, (ii) severance, and (iii) an apparent, continuous, and reasonably necessary use of the land for the easement-holder's beneficial use and enjoyment.
Neither party disputed these factors and the Court therefore held thatJack originally owned both parcels, the partition severed that ownership, and access
across Johnny's section was reasonably necessary for Jack to exercise his stock
water right.
The crux of the dispute rested on whetherJack and Johnny intended Jack's
use of Flatwillow Creek to continue after the land partition. Jack did not have
access to any other source for stock water besides Flatwillow Creek. The Court
observed that Johnny, at the time of the partition negotiations, knew Jack possessed the water right and had no other source from which to use it. The Court
also noted that nothing in the record suggested Jack intended to stop using Flatwillow Creek for his cattle. The Court reasoned that if the partition excluded
Jack from exercising his water rights then the partition agreement would be inequitable and could not stand. As a result, the Court held the record supported
Jack's implied easement by existing use because both he and Johnny intended
the stock water use to continue after severance of the two parcels.
In opposition, Johnny further argued that Jack surrendered his water rights
to Flatwillow Creek when he agreed to the partition. As Johnny argued, the
partition identified and valued the two parcels of land as "dry pastureland" and
"irrigated land." Jack grantedJohnny all of the available irrigated land, including
Flatwillow Creek. As a result,Johnny argued, Jack consciously gave up his stock
water right. However, the Court disagreed and found that Johnny's argument
overlooked the fact thatJack's water rights benefited land not subject to the partition.
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The Supreme Court therefore concluded that, by agreeing to the partition,
Jack did not intend to give away his water rights used on land not included in
the agreement. The Court remanded the issue to the lower court to determine
the best and most equitable way to provide Jack access to Flatwillow Creek.
Allison Robinette

NEBRASKA
Middle Niobrara Natural Res. Dist. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 838 N.W.2d
242 (Neb. 2013) (holding the Natural Resources Districts' allegations lacked
standing because they did not allege any legal right, title, or interest in the subject
water of the Niobrara River and Thomas Higgins' allegations lacked standing
because the harm was speculative and not distinguishable from the harm that
would be caused to any other landholder within the natural resources district).
The Middle and Lower Natural Resources Districts ("NRDs") and Thomas
Higgins unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court of Nebraska ("Court")
the Department of Natural Resources' ("DNR") dismissal of their action for
lack of standing. The purpose of the action was to object to Nebraska Public
Power District's ("NPPD") application to appropriate an additional 425 cubic
feet per second of natural flow from the Niobrara River. The NRDs are responsible for the management of ground water within their districts. Higgins is
the owner of real property in the Niobrara River Basin who holds senior water
rights and pending surface water appropriations from the Niobrara River. The
DNR dismissed the appellant's objections sua sponte for lack of standing. According to DNR, NRD lacked standing because it did not allege any legal right,
title, or interest in the subject water of the Niobrara River and their allegation of
harm was based upon mere conjecture. Higgins did not fulfill the standing requirement because no legal right existed regarding a pending application. Further, if DNR granted the pending applications, Higgins rights would be senior
to NPPD and there was no evidence of credible harm.
The Court considered four issues on appeal. First, whether the director
erred when he determined that NRD did not have a cognizable interest to fulfill
the standing requirement. Second, whether Higgins would be adversely affected
in a manner sufficient to confer standing. Third, whether DNR applied an improper standard of review. Fourth, whether DNR failed to consider the impact
of the decision on the public interest.
The Court affirmed DNR's assertion that the NRDs did not have standing.
The NRDs failed to allege any legal right, title, or interest and their allegations
were based on mere conjecture. The NRDs argued the granting of NPPD's
application would cause a portion of the Niobrara River to be fully appropriated
in the future, and a threatened injury would satisfy the standing requirements.
The NRDs further argued they had standing because they were responsible for
the management of ground water from the Niobrara River. The Court, in a
previous case, determined that standing exists when duties are placed upon the
NRDs when DNR makes a fully appropriated designation. In this case, how-

